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Peter J.T. 0 Hearn* From Representation by
Population to the Pursuit of
Elegance
I. The Future Format of the Constitution
Will the Canadian people be content with the present format of our
recently won constitution? I do not think so. The obstacles to any
further changes are indeed formidable, but they were equally
formidable in the cases of the changes that have been achieved. In
those cases, a popular will was at work which was spurred by the
energy of a near-coalition of aggrieved groups, but which gently
forced these energies into the formation of a more moderate
working consensus. It is true that the consensus is a crippled one,
especially concerning Quebec, and several problems will have to be
settled before we can truly say that we have a satisfactory and
nation-wide constitutional understanding and before we give
constitutional law-making a rest for a while.
The most important of these problems would currently appear to
be: (a) the preservation of Quebec as the home of a North-
American French culture; (b) the determination of the rights of the
indigenous peoples of Canada; (c) the proper allocation of
ownership and legislative control over the exploitation of natural
resources; (d) an improved distribution of primarily legislative, as
well as executive and judicial, powers in the country; and
(e) enlargement of the areas wherein both federal and provincial
legislation is possible. Most of what I might be permitted to say on
these subjects, given the limits of judicial impartiality and propriety
(in which I am a firm believer), has already been published, most of
it in my text, Peace, Order and Good Government, A New
Constitution for Canada.' What I wrote then, however, was
incomplete with respect to the first problem, that of preserving
Quebec French culture. I was skeptical about any real prospect of
English-speaking Canada giving in, and I did not deal with the
second problem, which was then not a live issue. Therefore, with
*Judge of the County Court, Halifax.
1. 0 Hearn, Peace, Order and Good Government, A New Constitution for Canada
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1964) o.p.
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respect to each of these problems, I am making a few comments of a
political science or sociological, rather than a political, nature.
One of the most beautiful traditions grounded in our pre-
Confederation history was the understanding between Robert
Baldwin and Louis-Hippolyte LaFontaine that their parties would
work for reform together and that each would respect the cultural
values of both English and French Canadians, 2 whether they
constituted a majority or a minority in the part of Canada in
question. This understanding, which has a claim to the title
L'entente canadienne, was observed quite well by the Reform
Party, at least in the early days, and was to some extent accepted by
the other parties. 3 Unfortunately, it led to a logical but impractical
aberration - the demand for the double majority. That is, it was
held that the government should have the support of a majority of
members from each division of the Province of Canada (Canada
East and Canada West). 4 The implementation of this demand
contributed to the breakdown of stable government in Canada in the
early 1860s and to the drive towards Confederation, 5 thereby
illustrating that goodwill is necessary, but is not, of itself, sufficient
to establish practical equality of citizenship and human rights
among members of sufficiently distinct cultural groups. Where two
such groups occupy the same territory, it is the case that the more
equal in number they are, the more likely it is that conflict will
ensue, leading to disruption of the community. 6 In any other case,
one or the other culture will be subjected to many social, political,
economic, or even juridical disabilities.
The most practical and effective counter-measure has been to yield
some political autonomy to the minority culture, under the aegis of
2. While this is evident from the standard texts which discuss the lives of Baldwin
and LaFontaine, I have been unable to find a clear statement of the entente. The
closest is that given in Canada-Quebec, Synthse Historique (Montreal: Editions
du Renouveau P~dagogique Inc., 1970) at pp. 343, 354.
3. See, for example, Archibald MacMechan, The Winning of Popular Government
(Chronicles of Canada, No. 27) (Glasgow, Brook, Toronto, 1920) at p. 94, on the
Draper Ministry of 1844-47.
4. See, for example, J.M.S. Careless, Brown of the Globe (Toronto: Macmillan,
1959) vol. 1, pp. 219-24.
5. Ibid, pp. 310, 315. See also, Peter B. Waite, The Life and Times of
Confederation (Toronto: U.T.P., 1962) Ch. 4; and Donald Creighton, The Road to
the Confederation (Toronto: Macmillan, 1964) at pp. 43-4. Neither Creighton nor
Waite indexes "double majority".
6. Modern instances abound: Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Israel-Palestine, Belgium.
Even Switzerland, where there are good constitutional "'fences" between the
cantons, has problems of this kind.
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which that culture can be recognized and given the practical force of a
dominant culture. This is what happened with respect to Quebec at
Confederation, 7 but in that case, the rights of the English minority in
Quebec were accorded a parallel protection,8 with one or two political
vehicles to sustain them. 9 An interesting local example is the
Argyle-Clare consolidated school board, which has been set up to
function predominantly in French and could become a recognized
protector of Acadian cultural interests in western Nova Scotia. As is
always the case, it too is being contested by the minority affected,
which, in this instance, is English-speaking.
Human beings have a fundamental appetite forstatus, even for equal
status. Members of a minority culture will suffer continual frustration
of this appetite unless they are able to satisfy it within their own
community. In practical terms, the minority culture's community must
achieve sufficient autonomy to realize an area (not necessarily
geographical or physical) of dominance for the benefit of its members.
Thus, it is important to francophones outside of Quebec that French be
accepted as the dominant culture in Quebec: it represents a
counterbalance to the English-speaking dominance found elsewhere
and a potential, albeit theoretical, base where they can, if necessary,
realize their equal citizenship. Theory is more important here than
practice. With respect to the rights of the indigenous peoples of
Canada, claims for some measure of political autonomy are already
being advanced, 10 especially in the territories. This issue will not
simply die where these people comprise communities of indigenes,
capable and desirous of maintaining some form of their traditional way
of life. This fact is greatly fortified now by the financial stake of the
indigenes in natural resources, a factor that probably energized the
current drive for recognition in the first place.
It promises to be a long time before these questions are settled.
Meanwhile, we have the suggestions of a kind of reverse apartheid to
be concerned about. Cultural separation is not necessarily bad, but it
can lead to inequities in mixed societies where all are to be equal under
7. Mainly by means of the Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 92 and 93.
8. Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 93, 133, 91 (cl. 25), 72-80.
9. Eventually the Quebec Protestant and English-speaking Catholic school boards
became the most important of these.
10. See, for example, press reports of a conference -Land/People/Government:
Native Perspectives on the Constitution", held in Toronto on February 26, 1983,
which was attended by leaders of four major Ontario natives organizations and by
George Erasmus, President of the Dene Nation, the majority inhabitants of
Canada's Northwest Territories.
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the law, and to gross inequity where those who should be accorded the
equal rights of citizens, or even of human beings, are denied those
rights.
At the end of this essay, I intend to treat the topic of equal
representation in Parliament of the people of Canada, or the principle
of representation by population. This principle was in fairly constant
collision with the principle of the equality of the two cultures, French
and English, from about 1850 onwards.' 1 The Confederation
settlement was not straight representation by population, but a slight
compromise. 12 The preceding remarks on the two problems
mentioned are, therefore, not totally parenthetical, but are pertinent as
background.
To return to my opening question, the main reason for my thinking
that Canadians will not rest satisfied with the present format of our
constitution is that to do so would be contrary to the legislative habits of
our legislatures, courts, and legal profession, as well as to something in
the Canadian temperament that seems to favour clearing away the old,
from time to time, to make way for a fresh start. In order to appreciate
the elements in the present situation that would spark the urge to
consolidate and restore the law of the constitution, it is only necessary
to look at the present format.
II. The Present Format of the Constitution
The Constitution Act, 1982 provides in s. 52(2) that the Constitution
of Canada includes - thus there may be more - the following:
"(a) The Canada Act, 1982, including this Act [that is, the Constitution
Act, 1982]; (b) the Acts and orders referred to in the schedule; and
(c) any amendment to any Act or order referred to in paragraph (a) or
(b)." The Canada Act, 1982 might be excluded from further active
participation in the Constitution as being merely the completion of the
Statute of Westminister, 193113 and as constituting a legislative
"Good-bye and good luck!" from the Parliament of the United
Kingdom. There would certainly be no need to work it into a
11. See Careless, Brown of the Globe, vol. 1, p. 155, etc. There are many
references thereafter, as well as in the first half of vol. 2.
12. See Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 40 and 51. The following is an 1871
comparison of seats and population by percentages:
N.S. N.B. Que. Ont. Man. B.C.
% Seats 9.95 7.85 34 42.9 2.1 3.1
% Pop. 10.9 8 33.6 45.7 .7 1
13. Statute of Westminister, 1931, 22 Geo. V. (Imp.), Ch. 4.
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consolidation of the constitutional acts. Section 3, which deals with the
authority of the French version, is clear enough in its French version,
where it applies only to Schedule A, but its English version is arguably
applicable to both Schedules A and B. This is not likely to become a
judicial problem - I hope.
The schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982 is entitled
"Modernization of the Constitution" and contains thirty items,
beginning with the Constitution Act, 1867, formerly the British
North American Act, 1867. Of the thirty items, several are, or
contain, repealing provisions, although many merely change short
titles of acts or orders or supply them where necessary.
Nevertheless, some substantial changes have been made, largely as
a result of the adoption of procedures for constitutional amendment.
What is important for our present purposes is that it is almost
impossible to have an integrated grasp of the present law without a
consolidated text, which, no doubt, will be forthcoming, probably
in several versions. None will be authentic, however, in the sense
that there will be no need to look at its sources. We shall have to be
content to live with this until the constitutional authorities agree on a
consolidated test, and that, I surmise, will take some time. This
need not be painful; English lawyers have been practicing for
generations with private collections of laws and are accustomed to
dealing with different statutes, some of considerable antiquity, on
the same subject. But, as that is not our style, I anticipate pressure
for consolidation.
What to include in such a consolidation is a question of some
difficulty. Should it include all of the surviving acts and orders?
What about the terms of union with the various provinces? These
are constitutional documents, but they primarily concern the
relationships of the individual provinces with the government of
Canada. In some respects, they are like enactments, bringing treaties
into force. The terms of union of the original four provinces are set
out in the Constitution Act, 1867 itself, which also contains the
constitutions of Ontario and Quebec, to the extent that they have not
since been altered by the legislatures concerned. The result is not
exactly chaos; there is some very good drafting in the Canada Act,
1982 and its schedules, despite the serpent-swallowing-its-own-tail
character of some provisions (for example, sections 52(2) and
(3) of the Constitution Act, 1983). On the other hand, it does not
exhibit the kind of order that a written constitutional law ought to
have. A written constitutional law exists not only for the
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information of legislatures, executives, and courts, but it is a most
important political statement to the citizens themselves. It should
exist in such a form that some idea of the whole can be had by the
populace, it can be taught in the schools, and it will permit an
intelligent lay appreciation of the main elements of constitutional
government and the relationships between them. There are written
constitutions that approach this character. The Constitution of the
United States of America, despite the many subsequent amend-
ments, remains a political statement of great power. Part of this
power derives from the clarity and apparent simplicity with which it
resolves certain problems, for example, the problem of representa-
tion (Art. 1, sec. 2, cl. 3; Amd. XIV, sec. 2; Art. 1, sec. 3, cl. 1;
Amd. XVII). This solution and several others possess the quality of
elegance that I will propose as an ideal for our own.
III. The Idea of Elegance in Law
The word and the idea of elegance come to us from the Roman
world in general and especially from the Roman law. The root
word is eligere, which means "to pick out", "to choose", and "to
select". By the classical period, a great appreciation of beauty and
good taste had developed and elegans came to mean "choice",
"nice", "fine", "tasteful", and "elegant". This meaning seems
to be due to the happy inspiration of Imperial Rome, and evokes the
notion of revelatory power that "elegant" now conveys in law,
physics, and mathematics.
The Praetors of Republican and Imperial Rome developed the
content of thejus gentium to apply to non-Romans, and this in turn
was based on the idea of the Law of Nature. This law, which
underlay all human laws and of which they were an imperfect
expression, was conceived to be ultimately composed of simple and
harmonious elements, elements that were intelligible, discoverable,
and expressible. 14 The more apt the expression and the more closely
and accurately it was able to disclose the underlying simplicity and
harmony, the more simple and harmonious the expression itself
would be and the more justly it could be described as "elegant".
The aptness or suitability of the expression is an important part of its
evocative power (which is probably why 29 C.J.S. 1201 gives the
primary meaning of elegans as "accurate"). Of equal importance,
14. This is brought out by the 10th edition of Sir Henry Maine's Ancient Law, as
annotated by Sir Frederick Pollock in the 1906-1916 reprints, esp. ch. 3 and 4.
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however, is the need for simplicity, and this implies a certain
economy of means, consonant with the ultimate simplicity of nature
(a classical foundation for Ockham's razor 15).
In fact, nature may not be all that simple; every new advance in
physical science seems to turn up more and more depths of being.
Nevertheless, scientists adhere to the intuition of the ultimate unity and
simplicity of nature. Northrop Frye writes, in The Anatomy of
Criticism, that "[wihat distinguishes, not simply the epigram, but,
profundity itself from platitude is very frequently rhetorical wit. In fact
it may be doubted whether we ever really call an idea profound unless
we are pleased with the wit of its expression."' 16 The Chicago
columnist, Sydney Harris, is more vehement, saying, "If the solution
to a scientific problem does not possess its own kind of beauty (what the
scientists call 'elegance'), we may be sure it is wrong, or at least not the
ultimate solution." 1 7 Whatever may be the case with nature and the
real world, law provides an ideal realm for the application of elegant
solutions. Law invariably creates a universe of discourse and every
legal system tends to become an ideology. Despite Mr. Justice
Holmes' aphorism about experience, which expressed his personal
approach to law, the history of legal systems has quite often been that
described by Sir Henry Maine in Ancient Law: ". . . over the larger
part of the world, the perfection of law has always been considered as
consisting in adherence to the ground-plan supposed to have been
worked out by the original legislator. If intellect has in such cases been
exercised onjurisprudence, it has uniformly prided itself on the subtle
perversity of the conclusions it could build on ancient texts, without
discoverable departure from their literal tenor." 18 He goes on to show
how the Roman jurists escaped this fate because of their ideal of
simplicity and harmony, or "elegance". The point is, however, that
all legal systems generate general statements applicable to particular
cases, and there will always be a gap between the real world and the
idealized world embodied in the law, whether or not the developers of
the system try to adhere to reality or not. Generalization,
harmonization, and simplification thus suit the nature of law almost as
much as they suit mathematics and physics.
15. Essentia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.
16. Northrup Frye, The Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton U.P., paperback ed.
1971, 1973) p. 329.
17. Sydney J. Harris, in his syndicated column in the Halifax Chronicle-Herald,
February 20, 1979.
18. Op. cit., note 14, p. 83.
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There are many individual instances of elegant statements in law,
and quite a few of these attain their revelatory power by incorporating,
through cross-reference, legal concepts from other parts of the law and
applying them to the matter at hand. Section 186(2) of the Bills of
Exchange Act, 19 which applies bill-of-exchange terms to promissory
notes, is a straightforward and unglamorous example. In the Corpus
Juris Canonici of 1917, can. 100, s. 3 equates the legal status of
corporations to that of minors. 20 The implications are obviously
far-reaching: for example, does it impose a rule similar to that in
Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche, 21 where the House
of Lords held that a contract not within the objects of a
memorandum-of-association company was ultra vires and void?
Similarly, simply by employing the word "fault", our Contributory
Negligence Act 22 imported into the law of negligence the admiralty
rule, applicable to collisions at sea since the Maritime Conventions
Act 1911,23 which has a civil law background.
To see any beauty in incorporation by reference, it is necessary to
appreciate the material incorporated, at least to the extent that the
comparison of the two fields reveals something about one or other
or both of them. This is part of a general theory of aesthetics. I
favour a fairly absolute theory of beauty - I hold that it can be
appraised according to certain standards - but beauty is in the eye
of the beholder to the extent that the appreciation of a work of art
depends upon an understanding of the idiom in which it was created
and the relationships involved. To this end, T.S. Eliot thoughtfully
annotated his poems because he chose on occasion to write in an
esoteric idiom. Yet incorporation by reference is not the only form
of legislative statement that has a claim to elegance. The sections of
the Sale of Goods Act 24 which deal with conditions and warranties
and with sale by sample have always struck me as a very neat and
succinct codification and restatement of the law, and one that probes
in some depth the nature of sale in our economy. Here again, an
19. R.S.C. 1970c. B-5.
20. C.J.C. (1917) can. 100, § 3. Personae morales sive collegiales sive non
collegiales minoribus aequiparantur.
21. Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche (1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 653.
22. Contributory Negligence Act, S.N.S. 1926, c. 3.
23. Maritime Conventions Act, 1911, 1-2 George V (Eng.), c. 57. See K.W.
Ryan, An Introduction to the Civil Law (Sydney: Law Book Co. of Australia, 1962)
pp. 118-120.
24. Sale of Goods Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 274, ss. 12 to 17: these are ss. 10to 15
of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893,56 and 57 Vic. (U.K.) c. 71.
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exact knowledge of the meaning of the terms employed is necessary
to an appreciation of the force of these provisions. This emphasizes
that often it is only the expert that can appreciate the elegance of an
expression or other work of art. However, there are legal devices
that can be appreciated without extensive legal knowledge. One
such is the subrog tuteur, or supplementary guardian, whose
particular function is to represent the ward whenever the ward's
interests are in conflict with the guardian's; this implies an
obligation of general oversight of the administration.
2 5
Is it possible to go beyond examples so as to define elegance in a
formal way? It probably is not possible in any truly satisfactory
sense, but certain general notions may be posited. For example,
elegance is a species of beauty and beauty is one of the four
transcendental attributes, so called because they apply in some
sense to every being. (No doubt it takes a metaphysician to assert
with a straight face that everything is to some extent beautiful, but
we need not pursue that here.) Beauty is the sum of the other three
transcendental attributes - unity, truth, and goodness - and it
consists in the clarity with which a being's integrity (unity),
proportion (goodness), and truth (intelligibility) appear. These
elements of beauty are part of the notion of elegance.
A leading American mathematician of the first half of this
century, George David Birkhoff, attempted a mathematical theory
of aesthetics. 26 While the theory proposed has not been widely
accepted, Birkhoff made some suggestive points. He considered the
three main variables of the typical aesthetic experience to be the
complexity of the object (C), the property of harmony, symmetry,
or order (0), and the feeling of value or aesthetic measure
(M). For these he proposed the formula M =O/C (although, for
reasons too long to go into here, I think a case can be made for M =
C/O). Birkhoff points out that fixing the attention on an object
requires effort and involves tension, and that the effort and tension
are not pleasurable, but negative, in tone. This negative effect
increases with the complexity of the object, and is resolved by the
perception of order.
It is doubtful whether this analysis goes far enough. Effort is not
necessarily negative in tone: it can be positive where it involves an
25. See Code civil de la Province de Quebec, art. 267 to 27 1.
26. See "Mathematics of Aesthetics", in James R. Newman, ed., The World of
Mathematics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1956) vol. iv, 2185 (reprinted from
G.D. Birkhoff, Aesthetic Measure (Cambridge U.P., 1933)).
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exercise in mastery, such as the kind of pleasure that an expert
might derive from painting, skiing, carpentry, or the drafting of
laws. Those times that effort will be negative are when it encounters
frustration or difficulty, without mastery. In addition, every
complex object can be considered as an aggregate: it may be
madeup of things or ideas. Attention is paid to an aggregate for the
purpose of understanding it in some sense. An expression, or a
statement revealing the principle of unity of the aggregate, which
shows us how to understand the relationships of the aggregate's
elements (or its harmony) and which thus makes manifest the
intelligibility (or the truth) of the object is elegant if it performs its
function in the simplest and most economical way. The elegant
expression, once grasped, gives instant satisfaction as a result of its
integrity, suitability, and clarity.
This is probably not a sufficient definition of elegance because
any truly elegant expression has an impact that goes beyond mere
quick comprehension and speaks to our intuition. But it will suffice
for present purposes. I will now turn once again to the issue of
representation by population.
IV. Representation by Population
Lord Durham, in his Report, proposed that parliamentary
representation in the united Province of Canada be "as near as may
be, in proportion to population," adding at once that:
27
I am averse to every plan that has been proposed for giving
an equal number of members to the two Provinces, in order to
attain the temporary end of out-numbering the French, because I
think the same object will be obtained without any violation of
the principle of representation, and without any such appearance
of injustice in the scheme as would set public opinion, both in
England and America, strongly against it; and because, when
emigration shall have increased the English population in the
Upper Province, the adoption of such a principle would operate
to defeat the very purpose it is intended to serve. It appears to me
that any such electoral arrangement, founded on the present
provincial divisions, would tend to defeat the purposes of union,
and perpetuate the idea of disunion.
27. Lord Durham's Report, edited and abridged by Gerald M. Craig, (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1963) (Carleton Library No. 1) p. 168 (p. 239 in 1902
edition).
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Durham's expressed purpose for the union was to absorb the
French into the English-speaking world of North America through
natural processes. 28 He estimated the population of Upper Canada,
around the year 1838, to be 400,000, while there were 150,000
English in Lower Canada and 450,000 French. 29 Thus, the English
already had a clear majority in the proposed united province and
could only continue to augment their numbers. Nevertheless, the
Upper Canadians insisted on equal representation with Lower
Canada in the new provincial parliament, and Canada West and
Canada East were each alloted 42 members by the Union Act, 1840
(this was changed in 1854 to 65 members each). 30 During the
1840s, Lower Canadians held that there was a right to greater
representation for Canada East, and, as late as 1849, some
French-Canadian rouges introduced the first measure for representa-
tion by population in Parliament; however, it failed. 3 The census of
1851 showed that Canada West exceeded Canada East in population
by 60,000 (952,004 as opposed to 890,261),32 and the shoe was on
the other foot. It was obvious by the mid- 1850s that the population
of Canada West was growing faster than that of Canada East, and
George Brown brought in his first representation-by-population
proposals in 1853. 33 Conservatives and bleus united to block all
such measures.
Although the demand for representation by population rep-
resented the ideal of equality, it was really inspired by the inability
to achieve a stable Canadian government from 1854 to 1864, a
period in which ten or so ministries succeeded one another. The last
real double majority was in 1858; thereafter, every government had
only minority support in one section of the country.
34
As Confederation approached, it was thought that the French
would be overwhelmed in a federation of the BNA provinces;
nevertheless, Brown, at the Quebec Conference, insisted that
representation by population was fundamental to the proposed
federation. The matter first came up with respect to the legislative
28. Ibid. pp. 158-9(in 1902 ed., pp. 227-8).
29. Ibid.
30. The Union Act, 1840, 3 and 4 Vic. (Imp.), c. 35, Para. XII.
31. See Careless, Brown of the Globe, vol. 1, p. 165.
32. See Canada-Quebec, Synth~se Historique, supra, note 2, p. 359; Historical
Statistics of Canada, Urquhart and Buckly, eds., (Cambridge U.P., 1965) p. 14,
series A2-14.
33. See Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation, supra, note 5, p. 36.
34. See Canada-Qu bec, pp. 358-9.
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council (which later became the Senate), but the discussion
concerning what was to become the House of Commons brought
home to the Prince Edward Island delegates, already hostile to the
scheme, that their membership of 5 would be overwhelmed in a
house of 194.35 The fear of lost membership and lost influence, felt
by the smaller provinces, thus entered Canadian politics, an element
which has since been constant in the game of the redistribution of
seats in the House of Commons. Of late, however, it has been of
more concern to politicians than to the people of the provinces.
The initial representation was set by the Constitution Act, 1867 at
82 members for Ontario, 65 for Quebec, 19 for Nova Scotia, and 15
for New Brunswick. 36 This was strict representation by population.
Section 5 1 set out the rules for fixing the provincial memberships
after each decennial census, beginning in 1871. Quebec was made
the basis, with the fixed number of 65 members, and the
membership of the other provinces was determined by population.
In the computation, a fractional remainder would not entitle the
province to a member unless it exceeded one half. Thus, in 1861
the populations of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Ontario were
such that New Brunswick and Ontario benefitted from the fractional
rule, but Nova Scotia did not. Section 52 of the act permitted the
Canadian Parliament to increase the number of members, provided
that the proportionate representation of the provinces was not
disturbed. Presumably, this meant increasing Quebec's membership
to more than 65, although this is not explicit in the text. This
scheme has a certain elegance. The principle of proportionality is
straightforward and easily grasped, and appeals to our sense of
fairness. It manifests the relationships involved immediately and
clearly. And anchoring the number of members in each province to
that of Quebec's determines at once the total number of members
and stabilizes it by reference to a mature and stable population.
The rules of the Constitution Act, 1867 relied on two simple
bases: representation by population and Quebec's fixed member-
ship. The fractional rule was merely a necessary clarification. There
was one interesting qualification, brought forward from Quebec
Resolution 21 (London Resolution 22), contained in section 5 1, rule
4, as follows:
35. See Creighton, The Road to Confederation, supra, note 5, pp. 155-7; Waite,
op. cit., pp. 94-5.
36. Constitution Act, 1867, 30-31 Vic. (Imp.), c. 3, s. 37.
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On any such Re-adjustment the Number of Members for a
Province shall not be reduced unless the Proportion which the
Number of the Population of the Province bore to the Number of
the aggregate Population of Canada at the then last preceding
Re-adjustment of the Number of Members for the Province is
ascertained at the then latest Census to be diminished by One
Twentieth Part or upwards.
The meaning of this is not immediately clear, but it may be
expressed mathematically, as follows: where Pi, P2, Ci, and C2
represent the populations of a province and of Canada, respectively,
in two successive censuses, then, if (P2/C2) + (Pl/Ci) > .95, the
province is not to lose membership. Section 51, rule 4, does not
state what happens if a province loses proportionality within the
percent limit twice in a row but so as to exceed the limit over the
two decades.
Under rule 4, a province did not have to lose population to lose
seats. If the proportionate increase of the province's population over
the decade between censuses did not exceed 95 percent of the
proportionate increase in the Canadian population, the province
would have lost membership. This is evident if one multiplies each
side of the inequality in the above formula by C2/Ci, as follows:
P2/P1 > .95 C2/C1. Prince Edward Island lost membership after the
1881-91 decade, when its increase of .17 percent failed to reach 95
percent of the Canadian increase factor which was 11.76 percent.
The same situation arose in 195 1, 1961, and 197 1, but by then rule
4 had been replaced. Between 1891 and 1931, Prince Edward Island
actually lost population in each decade, and, in the two decades
between 1931 and 1951, Saskatchewan, which had previously been
well above the Canadian average in gains, also lost population. In
the case of each province, new devices were adopted to counteract
the loss of membership. Meanwhile, between 1921 and 1941,
Quebec's population increased by 41.2 percent, while Canada's
increased by only 3.9 percent. 37 Under section 51, rule 1, which
made Quebec's 65 members the basis for fixing the total number of
members, the increase in Quebec's population would have resulted
in a diminution of the whole number. Nova Scotia and New
37. Historical Statistics of Canada, supra, note 31. The 1961-81 increase factors
are: Canada, 133.47 percent, and Quebec, 122.42 percent, which more than
reverses the rates. The figures upon which my comments on population are based
from here on are derived mostly from this text, from the Canada Year Books for
1961, 1972, and 1980-81, and from the Statistics Canada leaflet, "A Profile of
Canada, the Provinces and Territories from the 1981 Census".
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Brunswick, after attaining representations of 21 and 16, respec-
tively, began to lose members steadily after 1891 (although Nova
Scotia made a short-lived recovery in 1949). And Ontario, after
increasing its representation to 92 members, was reduced to 82
members in 1917 and maintained the ratio of 82:65 with Quebec
until after 1946.
V. Significant Changes
This short history of representation by population will help to
explain the four significant changes that were made in the
representation formula before the adoption of the amalgam method
in 1974. The first change was the enactment of the Constitution Act,
1915, 38 which, inter alia, added section 51A as follows:
"Notwithstanding anything in this Act a province shall always be
entitled to a number of members in the House of Commons not less
than the number of senators representing such province." Without
this provision, the 1921 redistribution would have reduced Prince
Edward Island's membership to only two members; by 1904, its
original six had already been reduced to four. The next significant
changes were introduced by the British North America Act, 19 4 6 ,39
which established the aggregate population of the provinces as the
basis for computing the quotient and fixed the number of members
at 254 (plus one member for the Yukon and included territories).
40
This eliminated the effect of Quebec's faster population growth and
did so just before it began to drop behind the Canadian average. In
addition, the act of 1946 dropped rule 4, or the one-twentieth rule,
and provided a more complete rule for assigning members to
fractional remainders: a member was to be assigned to each
remainder, from the largest down to the smallest, until the total of
254 members were assigned. (Adding the remainders of all the
provinces should give the number of members to be added.)
38. Constitution Act, 1915, 5-6 Geo. V, c. 45 (Imp.).
39. British North America Act, 1946, 9-10 Geo. VI, c. 63 (Imp.), superseded by
the British North America Act, 1952, 1 Eliz. 11, c. 15 (Can.); both were repealed
by the Canada Act, 1892, schedule items 20 and 24 to the Constitution Act, 1982,
s. 53(l).
40. This became 261 (+ 1) on the admission of Newfoundland as a province, in
1949: see the Newfoundland Act, 12-13 Geo. VI, c. 22 (Imp.), Sch. Term 4, and
The Statute Law Amendment (Newfoundland) Act, (13 Geo. VI) St. Can. 1949,
Sess. I, c. 6, s. 52.
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The act also set out, for the first time, how the membership
cushion, provided for in s. 51 A, was to be dealt with:
(1) divide the total population of the provinces by 254 and then
divide the population of each province by the quotient: the whole
number so obtained is assigned to the province;
(2) assign the remainders in order from the largest until the 254
members have all been assigned;
(3) if the number of members assigned to a province is less than
the number of senators, it is assigned members equal in number to
the senators, and rules I and 2 cease to apply to that province;
(4) reduce the total population of the provinces by the population
of the province(s) excluded by rule 3 and reduce 254 by the number
of members assigned to the excluded province(s). Then apply rules
1 and 2 to the reduced numbers with respect to the remaining
provinces.
The final part of rule 4 will be recognized as a "loop"; it could be
invoked a second time if rule 3 produced a province or two which
needed the Senate cushion. Prince Edward Island has had to rely on
the Senate cushion since 1911, and New Brunswick has done so at
least since 1961. Nova Scotia has also been saved on one or two
occasions by a timely increase in the total membership.
The original one-twentieth provision (s.5 1, rule 4) need not be
characterized as a real departure from representation by population,
but as a means of easing a transition to a lesser membership.
However, s. 51 A, with rule 3 of s. 51, as enacted in 1946, must be
recognized as a true modification, embodying the distinct principle
of the right of a province to a meaningful membership in the House
of Commons.
In 1951, the census indicated that Saskatchewan would be
reduced to fifteen members, from twenty, in the next redistribution.
The Canadian Parliament then enacted the British North America
Act, 1952,' 4 1 which repealed s. 51 and substituted a new text. Rules
I to 4, as amended, remained the same. The Northwest Territories
41. British North America Act, 1952 (1 Eliz. I1), St. Can. 1952 c. 15. This was
the first statute the Canadian Parliament passed to amend the Constitution Act,
1867. It was passed pursuant to the British North America (No. 2) Act, 1949, 13
Geo. VI, c. 32 (Imp.), which, with the act of 1952, was repealed by the schedule to
the Canada Act, 1982, items 22 and 24. See Canada Year Book, 1973,
pp. 111-113, for history.
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were given a member distinct from the member for the Yukon, and
a new rule 5 was added, as follows:
(5) On any such readjustment the number of members of any
province shall not be reduced by more than fifteen per cent below
the representation to which such province was entitled under
rules one to four of this subsection at the last preceding
readjustment of the representation of that province, and there
shall be no reduction in the representation of any province as a
result of which that province would have a smaller number of
members than any other province that according to the results of
the then last decennial census did not have a larger population;
but for the purposes of any subsequent readjustment of
representation under this section any increase in the number of
members of the House of Commons resulting from the
application of this rule shall not be included in the divisor
mentioned in rules one to four of this subsection.
The immediate effect of this was to give Saskatchewan seventeen
members in the 1952 readjustment. 42 The eighty-five percent rule,
while much more generous than the former rule 4, was obviously a
temporary cushion of the same type and not essentially in
derogation of representation by population; it merely delayed it.
Nothing in rule 5 or in the 1952 version of s. 51 stated explicitly
what effect the application of the rule was to have on the total
number of members, but it was evidently construed by Parliament to
mean that any members saved by the eighty-five percent clause
were to be added to the total number of 263, as had been fixed by
the 1952 Act. This differs from the result under rule 4, and the
construction of the first clause of rule 5 would presumably apply to
the second clause, the effect of which is to ensure that any province
with a population larger than that of Nova Scotia or New Brunswick
is entitled to at least ten members.
Six elections, from 1953 to 1965, were based on the 1952 Act
and the subsequent readjustment. During this period, the mechanics
of allotting members to the provinces and drawing electoral-district
boundaries were the responsibility of the Representation Commis-
sioner and ten provincial electoral commissioners. 43 The results of
the 1961 Census had quite an impact. While Ontario, British
Columbia, and Alberta gained a total of six members, Quebec,
Nova Scotia, and Manitoba each lost one, and Saskatchewan lost
42. See Representation Act, 1952, (1 Eliz. 11), St. Can. 1952, c. 48, s. 1.
43. By the Representation Commissioner Act, St. Can. 1963, c. 40, and the
Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, St. Can. 1964-5, c. 31.
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four. 44 New Brunswick had to rely on s. 51A to keep its ten
members and Nova Scotia was saved from losing two members by
the eighty-five percent rule. The readjustment was delayed until
after the 1965 election by the late implementation of the new
mechanisms and by proceedings in Parliament. Nevertheless, in
1961, the readjustments came into force without change and
governed three elections. Another readjustment was required by the
results of the 1971 Census, and involved the gain of three members
by each of Ontario and British Columbia, but a loss of two members
by Quebec and one by each of Nova Scotia, Manitoba,
Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland. Nova Scotia was saved a further
loss by s. 51 A, as was Saskatchewan by rule 5.
During the 50s and 60s, it had become perfectly clear that
members of the House of Commons were finding the elimination of
provincial seats repugnant, if not due to motives of provincial pride
and dignity, then at least due to distaste for the possible elimination
of their own seats. Finding another seat becomes even more difficult
if the provincial membership consists mainly of people from the
member's own party, as tends to be the case. In late 1971, the
government introduced a bill to change the rules and raise the
membership to 269. It was reintroduced in February 1972, but was
not proceeded with. Then, in March, Premier Ed Schreyer of
Manitoba protested to Prime Minister Trudeau that the "floor
guarantees" of representation for the Maritime provinces were
disproportionate and in conflict with the principle of representation
by population. Mr. Schreyer also made alternative proposals, and
discussion continued. But when the final reports were received from
the electoral boundaries commission in July 1973, the House of
Commons accepted a government proposal to suspend readjustment
until January 1, 1975.
45
The Liberal government of the day was a minority one and relied
on New Democrat support. The Honourable Allan MacEachen,
President of the Privy Council, held discussions with the other
parties in 1971, but no consensus was reached. On January 11,
1974, "the system of readjusting representation in the House of
44. The wording of rule 5 is explicit that the 85 percent ratio applies not to the
membership allotted by a previous application of the rule, but to the membership
the province was then entitled to under rules I to 4. Under the 1951 readjustment,
Saskatchewan was allotted 17 members, but was entitled, under rules I to 4, to 15
members. 13/15 is within the 85 percent limit, that is, 86.6 percent.
45. Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Suspension Act, St. Can. 1973-74, c. 23.
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Commons, including the method of determining the number of
Members of each province established by Section 5 1 of the British
North America Act" was referred to the Standing Committee on
Privileges and Elections.
46
VI. The Amalgam Method
On February 20, 1974, Mr. MacEachen presented a paper to the
Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections which outlined the
background of the problem and stressed that representation by
population had never been the only principle involved in the
distribution of seats. Meaningful representation of provinces and
territories also had to be considered, as well as the size of the
average constituency population and the future effects of choosing
any system. Five different methods of distributing seats were
outlined by Mr. MacEachen, but he and the government favoured
the amalgam method, the system eventually adopted by the
Representation Act, 1974.47 The amalgam method is described in
Mr. MacEachen's statement as follows:
The "Amalgam Method" seeks to incorporate the following
objectives:
(a) the principle that no province shall lose seats as a result of
Redistribution and that the small provinces should continue
to have equitable representation:
(b) the need for better representation by population among the
provinces;
(c) continuation of Quebec as a pivotal element in Redistribu-
tion.
The provinces are divided into small, medium and large and
the rules are as follows:
(i) Small Provinces
Includes provinces having less than 1.5 million population:
Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan.
46. As cited at p. 1 of Redistribution 1974, "Approach and Perspectives", a
paper presented by the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, President of the Privy
Council and Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, to the Standing
Committee on Privileges and Elections, dated February 20, 1974. See Proceedings
of the Committee, No. 27, Feb. 20, 1974,
47. Representation Act, 1974, St. Can. 1974-75-76, c. 13, assented to December
20, 1974. The general election of July 8, 1974 was thus conducted under the
former rules.
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Whenever there is an increase in the population of a small
province its total number of seats is determined by dividing
its population by the average constituency population of the
small provinces in the previous Redistribution.
(ii) Medium Provinces
Includes provinces having between 1.5 million and 2.5
million population: Alberta and British Columbia for the
present Redistribution and Alberta only subsequently. A
population increase results in one additional seat for every
two the province would have received if it had been treated as
the small province with the largest average constituency
population.
(iii) Large Provinces
Includes the provinces having more than 2.5 million
population: Quebec and Ontario; after 1981 British
Columbia will be in this category. The Province of Quebec is
attributed 75 seats now and an additional 4 seats at each
following decennial census. The other provinces are
attributed a number of seats based on the average
constituency population of the Province of Quebec.
In making any calculation to arrive at a proper attribution of
seats, the remainder after any division is disregarded.
Any province which, because of Redistribution, would have a
lesser number of seats than another province with less population
is attributed the same number of seats as that province.
Considering the objectives to be attained, the amalgam method was
undoubtedly better than any of the other four discussed, which
included the 1952 rules. The reestablishment of Quebec with a fixed
but escalating membership eliminated the need to fix the overall
membership. Since 1961, however, Quebec's population growth has
tended to lag behind the Canadian average - in the 1971-81 decade, it
was only 6.8 percent as compared to Canada's 12.9 percent - and this
means that the total number of members will increase beyond what was
projected in 1974; that is, there will be a 16.3 percent increase for
Quebec as opposed to a 13.6 percent increase for Canada as a whole. 
48
The four-member decennial increase for Quebec can always be
interrupted, of course, but it indicates a reliance on a continuation of
the present conditions, a reliance that is at odds with Canadian
constitutional history. Our constitution-makers have always been
shortsighted about figures, an outstanding early example being the
48. Derived from 1981 and 1971 census figures (see, supra, note 36). See also
Appendix VII to Mr. MacEachen's statement (supra, note 45).
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federal subsidy replacing provincial revenue, introduced in the
original British North America Act, 1967, s. 118.
The amalgam plan was a carefully crafted and astute political
settlement and, as such, seems to have satisfied the members of the
House of Commons. As a constitutional settlement, the main
objection is that it obscures, rather than clarifies. Even in the
simplified form in which it is set out in Mr. MacEachen's statement,
it is hard to tell what the real differences in the three classes of
representation by population are likely to be. 49 The language of the
Representation Act, 1974, s. 2, is much more difficult to grasp.
One firm sign that the text needs editing is that the French text of
every paragraph is shorter, and sometimes considerably shorter,
than the English text. While it is granted that there has been an
improvement in the use of French idiom and tournures in drafting
federal laws of late, this contrast between English and French texts
is still at odds with the usual result. The English text actually
contains a definition of "penultimate decennial census", which the
French has the gumption to omit (the English text probably includes
it to avoid any confusion arising from the fifth-year censuses).
For the purposes of computation, the provinces are classified in
various ways: (a) Quebec; (b) large provinces, meaning those with
populations greater than 2.5 million; (c) provinces with populations
of less than 2.5 million and not less than 1.5 million;
(d) intermediate provinces, that is, those in class (c) which have an
increased population since the decennial census before last;
(e) provinces with populations of less than 1.5 million; and
(f) small provinces, that is, those in class (e) which have an
increased population since the census before last. This multiplica-
tion of classes appears to have evolved in order to meet the drafting
needs of rule 5(1)(b), which provides that where a class (c) or
class (e) province does not have a population increase between the
latest decennial census and the one before last, it retains the
membership assigned to it on the readjustment following the
decennial census before last. This, however, is subject to rules 5(2)
and (3), as well as to rule 6(2). In view of rule 5(2)(b), which
49. In the post- 1971 readjustment, Quebec's electoral quotient was 80,370 and the
small-province electoral quotient was 64,557. The Quebec figure was based on
Quebec's 1971 population, however, while the small-province figure was derived
from 1961 populations; thus, direct comparison is misleading. The current
(post-1981) figures are: Quebec, 81,499; small provinces, 66,196. The
Quebec/small-provinces ratios are: post-1971, 1.24, and post-1981, 1.23. This has
the virtues of consistency and stability.
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protects a province from loss of membership, rule 5(l)(b) hardly
seems worth having for the purpose of preventing any possible
increase in membership.
Two important electoral quotients are contained in the rules. The
first, the electoral quotient of Quebec, is the result obtained by
dividing the population of Quebec (Q), according to the most recent
decennial census (C), by the number of members to be assigned to it
under rule I in the readjustment following that census. That number
is 75 plus 4 additional members in each of (n) readjustments after
the post-1971 readjustment. The Quebec electoral quotient (qQ) not
only determines the membership of the large provinces (see rule 2,
subject to rules 5(2) and (3)), but is also the largest electoral
quotient that may be employed in the calculations (see rule 5(3)(a)).
For those who find formulas helpful, this can be expressed as
follows: qQ = Q(Ci)/(75 + 4n), where the terms have the meanings
noted above. The second important electoral quotient, the
small-province quotient (qs), is determined by dividing the sum of
the populations of those provinces, other than Quebec, that have
less than 1.5 million inhabitants - that is I(Sx,S2,S3 . . .) - at the
penultimate decennial census (Co), by the sum of the members
assigned to those provinces - Ym(S1,S2,S3. .. ) - at the
readjustment following that census (C,). This translates into the
following formula:
I(Sl,S2 ,S3 . . .) (Co)qs=
q m(S1,S2,S3 . . .) (Co)
The membership to which a small province is entitled (subject to
rules 5(2) and (3)) is ascertained by dividing the population of the
province by the small-province quotient (see rule 3) as follows:
mSx = (Co)/qs
where S,, signifies the (population of the) province in question.
There is an ambiguity in the meaning of "population" in Rule
3(b). In rule 6(1), it is stated that "population means, except where
otherwise specified [sauf indication contraire], the population
determined according to the results of the then most recent
decennial census (emphasis added)." The results of the post-1971
readjustment indicate that the representation of each small province
was determined by dividing its 1961 population by the small-
province quotient based on the 1961 populations and post-1961
membership. Thus, the agencies involved, including Parliament,
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construed "population" in the same sense as in rule 3(a) and,
hence, as referring to the figures of the penultimate census. 50 This is
rather odd because it bases the prima facie membership of the small
provinces on figures that are at least ten years out-of-date. The
effect of the Senate-floor provision (s. 51A) is, in general, to
increase the small-province representation, because the s. 51A
increases (three for Prince Edward Island and one for New
Brunswick, at present) are in addition to the membership
determined by the previous small-province quotient. As already
noted, rules 5(2)(b) and (l)(b) prevent any loss of representation,
and rule 5(2)(a), which gives a province a right to representation at
least equal to that of any province having a lesser population, may
cause an occasional increase. Rule 5(3) may also cause an
occasional increase by applying the electoral quotient of the
province. Thus, the figures for small-province representation can
only go up. On the other hand, the readjustment authority has
allocated the membership for the post-1981 readjustment by
dividing the 1981 population of each small province by a quotient
derived from 1971 population figures and post- 197 1 membership.
50. The following table exhibits the pertinent figures (only columns 2 and 7 match
the facts):
Assignment of Small-Province Representation Using Different "Populations"
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1961 pop 1971 pop 1
97
1 pop 1981 pop
1961 pop 1961 SPQ 1971 pop 1961 SPQ 1971 SPQ 1981 pop 1971 SPQ
Newfoundland 457,853 7.09 522,104 8.09 7.89 567,681 8.58
Prince Edward
Island 104,629 * 1.62 111,641 * 1.73 *1.69 122,506 * 1.85
Nova Scotia 737,007 11.42 788,960 12.22 11.92 847,442 12.8
New
Brunswick 597,936 *9.26 634,557 *9.83 *9.59 696,403 10.52
Manitoba 921,686 14.28 988,247 15.31 14.93 1,026,241 15.5
Saskatchewan 925,181 14.33 926,242 14.35 **13.99 968,313 14.63
Total 3,744,292 3,971,751 4,228,586
Members /58 60 /60 63 60 63
Small-province
quotient 64,557 66,196
Rule 6(2)(a) requires fractional remainders to be disregarded.
• The Senate floor (s. 51A) brings P.E.I. up to 4 members and N.B. up to 10.
•* Saskatchewan must have 14 members because that is its present membership:
see rule 5(2)(b).
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The small-province quotient is used in a modified form in rule 4
to determine the representation of the intermediate provinces. That
is, the figures of the latest decennial census are used, rather than
those of the penultimate one. This is symbolized as follows:
q((CO1 = (,2,3 . . .) (C)
Xm(S1,S2,S3 . . .) (Cl)
The symbolic representation of rule 4 is a bit more of a challenge:
m(I)x (Ci) = (I./qs (C1) + m(Ix) (C))
2
where "Ix" signifies the (population of the) intermediate province
in question and the other signs have those meanings already given.
This discussion is probably sufficient to demonstrate the
ingenuity and comprehensiveness of the present s. 5 1, as well as its
complexity, ambiguity, and obscurity. Is there any possibility of
simplifying, in the interests of constitutional clarity and elegance,
what appears to be a satisfactory political solution? There are
complications. Section 5 1A is now entrenched in the constitution by
the Constitution Act, 1982, s. 41(b), and requires the unanimous
consent of the provinces to any amendment. It is probably too
cherished a privilege to be tampered with. Representation by
population is also protected by the Constitution Act, 1982,
s. 42( l)(a) and (2). Subsection (l)(a) reads as follows:
(1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to
the following matters may be made only in accordance with
subsection 38( 1):
(a) the principle of proportionate representation of the
provinces in the House of Commons prescribed by the
Constitution of Canada;
Subsection (2) provides that the opting-out provisions of s. 38 do
not apply, and subsection 38(1) establishes the simplest method of
amendment: resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and
of the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces,
having in the aggregate fifty percent of the population of all the
provinces.
By virtue of the Constitution Act, 1981, s. 52(2) and schedule
item 28, the Constitution Act, 1974, which enacts the present
Constitution Act, 1867, s. 5 1, is included in the Constitution of
Canada. Does this mean that any substantial change to s. 5 1
requires a constitutional amendment?
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The amalgam plan is a partially successful attempt to combine the
principles of proportional representation and significant provincial
representation. In addition to its complexity, it suffers by being tied
to arithmetical bases: the numbers 1.5 million and 2.5 million are
fundamental to the scheme. While they are meaningful numbers
today because of the actual spread of population, in a few decades
they may make little sense. That has been the Canadian experience
as a result of tying a constitution settlement, meant to be long-term,
to exact figures.
A distinction that some may find invidious and demeaning is the
division into small, intermediate, and large provinces. Again, this is
the result of an arithmetical approach and the need to calculate three
distinct electoral quotients instead of devising one algebraic formula
that would incorporate both of the protected principles. In this
respect, the amalgam plan resembles the graduated income tax
imposed by the Income Tax Act, in that it is made up of a series of
steps, rather than a smooth curve. Just as a constant tax rate can be
turned into an evenly graduated tax by a tax allowance, 5 1 so a basic
membership for every province, coupled with additional member-
ship proportionate to population, would result in an evenly
graduated system of proportional representation.
VII. The Three-Plus Plan
Is this the better way? Let us examine a sample approach - call it
the "three-plus plan" - to see whether what are essentially the
same purposes can be achieved by a simpler, clearer, more
comprehensible scheme.
The following are the main elements of the three-plus plan:
Rule 1. Three members are assigned to each province.
Rule 2. In the readjustment following the decennial census of the
year 1971, Quebec would be assigned seventy-two additional
members and, in each subsequent readjustment, a number of
further additional members proportional to the increase if any in
the population of Quebec between the last decennial census and
the decennial census before last, such further additional members
not to exceed four on any readjustment.
51. For example, the tax rate on net income is 30 percent for everyone, but
everyone is entitled to a tax allowance of $2,000. A, with an income of $20,000,
pays $4,000 tax, an effective rate of 20 percent. B, with an income of $40,000,
pays $10,000 tax, an effective rate of 25 percent. C, with an income of $80,000,
pays $22,000, an effective rate of 27.5 percent.
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Rule 3. Each province would be assigned a number of additional
members calculated by dividing the population of the province by
the quotient resulting from dividing the population of Quebec by
the number of members assigned to Quebec under Rule 2.
To be fair, this should be reduced to symbols for comparison with
the earlier formulas, as follows: mPx = P, - (Q/(72+n))+3, where
"n" refers to the further additional members provided for in rule 2.
Rules 1 to 3 of the three-plus plan are designed to replace rules 1
to 5(1) of the amalgam method, and rule 5(3) would be circular and
meaningless. Rule 5(2)(a) is basically a complement to the
Constitution Act, 1867, s. 51A, and would have to be retained as
such. Rule 5(2)(b) is not a necessary or desirable part of the
three-plus plan, but is probably politically unchangeable unless
Canada experiences a radical increase in the number of provinces.
Most of rule 6(1) of the amalgam method would be omitted in the
three-plus plan, but the definition of "population" should be
retained in order to avoid repetition of the phrase "determined
according to the results of the then most recent decennial census."
Finally, rule 6(2) of the amalgam method should be retained,
especially clause (a), which directs that remainders less than one in
the calculation of the number of members be disregarded.
A comparison of the actual readjustments following the 1961,
1971, and 1981 censuses with the calculated results of using the
three-plus plan reveals that the divergences are not great, but the
additions provided for under the latter are, as expected, more
equitable in the case of the small and intermediate provinces. 52 The
increases in total membership, in comparison with those under the
amalgam method (post-1971 and 198 1), are not large enough to be
52. The figures are as follows:
Readjustment after 1961 1971 1981
Actual 3 + Actual 3 + Actual 3+
Newfoundland 7 9 7 9 8 9
P.E.I. 4 4 4 4 4 4
Nova Scotia 11 13 11 12 12 13
New Brunswick 10 11 10 10 10 11
Quebec 74 75 75 75 79 79
Ontario 88 88 95 95 105 104
Manitoba 13 15 14 14 15 15
Saskatchewan 13 15 14 14 14 14
Alberta 19 21 21 22 27 29
British Columbia 23 25 28 29 33 35
Totals 262 276 279 284 307 311
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of concern. Indeed, Professor John Courtney of the Department of
Economics and Political Science of the University of Saskatchewan
has put forward some interesting arguments for doubling the size of
the House to meet the workload. 53 The influence of size on the
character and conduct of groups is a topic too vast to go into here,
but my impression is that the larger the group, the more nearly a
nonentity the individual member becomes. The Canadian public
seems to be happy with the order of magnitude of the present House
of Commons.
Representation by population does not need any justification; it is
entrenched in our political history. The guarantee of a meaningful
representation in the House of Commons is also a recurring note in
our history, but there are some who hold that it requires
justification, at least where it is clearly visible, as it would be under
the three-plus plan. That justification is the need to counter the fears
of being "swallowed up" that inspired Prince Edward Island and
Newfoundland to reject confederation when it was first proposed.
The justification is the recognition of the principle since the
enactment of section 51A (the Senate floor) in 1915, as well as in
the 1952 revision of section 51 and in the amalgam method of 1974.
The principle is now part of our constitutional heritage and the only
question is how best to secure it. The three-plus plan is, of course,
only one of many possible ways of dealing with the question. It
seems to have the virtures of simplicity and clarity that are needed in
a constitutional statement. Whether it is politically viable is, of
course, another question entirely.
The following chart compares the results of the amalgam method
and the three-plus plan. The horizontal lines represent the results of
the amalgam method, while the vertical curve connects the points
representing the results of the three-plus plan. Both scales of the
chart are logarithmic and are in the ratio of 1/.508. The chart
illustrates how close the results of the two methods are, but it also
shows that the three-plus plan yields a smoother curve. A
logarithmic graph is needed to accommodate the differences in the
53. See Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections,
House of Commons, 32nd Pan., 1st. Sess., No. 20, April 6, 1982. 1 wish to
acknowledge Professor Courtney's kindness in providing this material and also in
directing me to the origin of the expression -amalgam method", which I had
completely forgotten since 1974!
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populations involved. Pure representation by population would be
represented on such a graph by a straight line, extending from the
right end of the Quebec line to the point on the vertical axis
representing the Quebec electoral quotient of 81,498.
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